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The cognitive map theory has been a dominant inﬂu-
ence over research into hippocampal function since
the publication of O’Keefe and Nadel’s 
 
The Hippocam-
pus as a Cognitive Map
 
 in 1978 (now freely available at
http://www.cognitivemap.net). The main premise of
the theory is articulated in the book’s ﬁrst paragraph:
“We shall argue that the hippocampus is the core of a
neural memory system, providing an objective spatial
framework within which the items and events of an
organism’s experience are located and interrelated”
(O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). The existence of “place
cells” in the hippocampus—principal cells that ﬁre se-
lectively when the animal occupies restricted locations
in an environment—is one of the primary pieces of evi-
dence in support of the theory (O’Keefe and Nadel,
1978; Ekstrom et al., 2003). Early investigations of place
cells characterized some of these cells as “misplace
cells” (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978), which ﬁred in a spe-
ciﬁc location only when an unexpected object or re-
ward was located in that place, or when an expected ob-
ject or reward was missing. Thus, object-related inﬂu-
ences on place cells were known from the very ﬁrst
investigations. Many subsequent experiments concen-
trated on the inﬂuences of distal landmarks on place
cells, however (O’Keefe and Conway, 1978; but see
Wible et al., 1986; Wiener et al., 1989). These experi-
ments showed that place ﬁelds were controlled primar-
ily by landmarks in the periphery of the environment,
in that rotation of these landmarks caused place ﬁelds
to rotate correspondingly. In contrast, rotation of the
recording apparatus generally had no effect on the
place ﬁelds. Thus, it became widely viewed that place
cells were selective for spatial locations deﬁned by the
distances and angles to distal visual cues. Over the past
decade, however, it has become clear that proximal, ap-
paratus-based cues can control place cell ﬁring if these
cues are matched in salience to the distal landmarks
(Young et al., 1994; Shapiro et al., 1997; Zinyuk et al.,
2000; Knierim, 2002a). In addition, the importance of
self-motion cues in updating the spatial representation
in the hippocampus also has been demonstrated (Mc-
Naughton et al., 1996; Knierim, 2002b). It is clear that
the location-speciﬁc ﬁring of place cells arises from an
interaction between proximal, distal, and self-motion
cues, the details of which are still being debated.
Regardless of the eventual resolution of the question
of how different types of cues interact to endow place
cells with their spatial speciﬁcity, a fundamental ques-
tion remains. What is the purpose of a cognitive map of
space? A map is useful as a spatial framework only if it
organizes and locates objects or places of importance
within that space. A map of New York City would not be
helpful if it did not incorporate the locations of poten-
tial destinations, such as the Empire State Building, the
Statue of Liberty, or one’s favorite Italian restaurant or
dance club. Similarly, a cognitive map of one’s bed-
room is only useful if it incorporates objects of interest,
such as the nightstand and bathroom door, allowing
one to move directly to these locations and avoid obsta-
cles even in total darkness. What happens, however,
when the nightstand is moved to a new location? How
does this new location become incorporated into the
map, and what happens to the representation of the
nightstand’s old location?
In this issue, Rivard et al. (2004) provide physiologi-
cal evidence that some place ﬁelds in the hippocampus
are bound to objects in an environment; when the ob-
jects are rotated or translated to new locations in the
environment, the place ﬁelds of these cells move with
the object. Rats were trained to forage for food pellets
in a cylindrical apparatus with a transparent barrier ex-
tending from the center of the cylinder to the 7:30
o’clock position at the edge of the cylinder. Place ﬁelds
were characterized at locations near and far from the
barrier. When the barrier was moved to new locations
in the cylinder, the far place ﬁelds were unaffected.
Place ﬁelds located near the barrier, however, tended
to move along with the barrier, showing that they were
bound to the movable object rather than to the sta-
ble framework of the cylinder. New place ﬁelds were
formed to ﬁll in the “hole” in the map created at the
old barrier location. Further, the place ﬁelds that previ-
ously occupied the new barrier location tended to
disappear, as if the cells that represent the object 
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took over the representation of that location in the
environment.
These results are important demonstrations of how
hippocampal cells represent both locations and objects
occupying those locations (at least large objects like a
barrier) in an apparently seamless manner. There are a
number of remarkable aspects to these ﬁndings. First,
the effects of the barrier appear to be local only to cells
that ﬁre near the barrier. Cells with place ﬁelds away
from the barrier are largely unaffected by the barrier
manipulations. This result is consistent with a number
of previous studies. Muller and Kubie (1987) ﬁrst dem-
onstrated that addition of a barrier into the place ﬁeld
of a cell could cause the cell to cease ﬁring. If the bar-
rier was placed in a location away from the place ﬁeld,
the cell remained unaffected. Similar results were
shown by Fyhn et al. (2002), who moved a learned goal
platform to a new location in an annular water maze
and saw that some place cells ﬁred at the new location,
whereas the place cells that represented the rest of the
maze were unaffected. In addition, Fenton et al. (2000)
showed that cells with place ﬁelds near two narrow cue
cards on the wall of a cylindrical chamber were con-
trolled by the nearest card when the cards were moved
further apart from each other, while cells with place
ﬁelds more distant from the cards were less affected by
the manipulation of the cues.
Another important ﬁnding of Rivard et al. (2004) is
that the place ﬁelds that were bound to the barrier in
one environment also were bound to the same barrier
in a completely different environment. Typically, if two
environments are sufﬁciently distinct in their sensory
landmarks or behavioral signiﬁcance, the hippocampus
creates two distinct representations of the two environ-
ments (i.e., the hippocampal representation “remaps”
from one environment to the other; Muller and Kubie,
1987; Knierim, 2003). With a complete remapping,
some cells have place ﬁelds in one of the environments
and are completely silent in the other, whereas other
cells have place ﬁelds in both environments but the lo-
cations of the ﬁelds are unrelated. In Rivard et al.
(2004), most place ﬁelds located away from the barrier
completely remapped two visually distinct environ-
ments. However, place cells that had ﬁelds near the bar-
rier tended to ﬁre near the barrier in the new environ-
ment as well. Thus, these cells did not partake in the
remapping of the new environment, suggesting that
they subserved a role related to the identiﬁcation of the
barrier rather than to the representation of the en-
closed environment. This result is markedly different
from that of Gothard et al. (1996), who demonstrated
similar object/goal-related ﬁring. In that study, rats
were trained to leave a goal box and ﬁnd food reward
either at the end of a linear track (experiment 1) or
near a movable beacon on a two-dimensional platform
in a different environment (experiment 2). Gothard et
al. (1996) found that in both experiments, some ﬁelds
were bound to the movable box rather than to the
static spatial cues in the environment. In contrast to the
current ﬁndings, however, box-related ﬁelds in one en-
vironment were not necessarily box-related ﬁelds in the
second environment. Gothard et al. (1996) suggested
that both place-related and box-related cells were the
same type of place cell, each tied to a different refer-
ence frame (the static environment vs. the dynamic
box). The barrier cells of Rivard et al. (2004) seem to
behave very differently, in that they are attached to the
barrier even when the rest of the place ﬁelds undergo
full remapping.
There are a number of intriguing questions that arise
from these results. One question regards the extent to
which the classic place cells and the barrier cells corre-
spond to two distinct classes of neurons, as Rivard et al.
(2004) argue. In any given environment, an estimated
33–40% of CA1 pyramidal cells are active and spatially
selective, while the remaining cells are virtually silent
(Wilson and McNaughton, 1993). In other environ-
ments, a different subset of the CA1 cells is active, with
some degree of overlap between the active subsets in
each environment. It thus has been argued that all py-
ramidal cells in CA1 of the dorsal hippocampus are po-
tential place cells, just waiting for the right environ-
ment to demonstrate a place ﬁeld. The question raised
by these results is whether the barrier-selective cells will
always be object related in all environments in which
they are tested sufﬁciently, or whether they may act as
classic place cells under other circumstances. The ﬁnd-
ing that they tend to maintain their ﬁring relative to
the barrier in a new environment, even though the rest
of the hippocampal representation remaps, suggests
that they may be a different class. This interpretation
must be put to a more stringent test, however. It is pos-
sible that the barrier-related cells may become classic
place cells in a new environment in which the barrier is
not present. Because most models of hippocampal cir-
cuitry and function assume that CA1 pyramidal cells
are a homogeneous class, a crucial question with pro-
found implications for these models is whether some
CA1 pyramidal cells are wired to represent the spa-
tial locations in an environment while other cells are
wired to represent the objects in that environment, or
whether each cell is capable of representing either lo-
cations or objects depending on the particular environ-
ment or context.
It is also important to understand whether the object-
related ﬁring in the present study is somehow particu-
lar to the barrier used in this study. In a previous study
in which a barrier inserted into a place ﬁeld caused lo-
cal disruptions, a smaller object (i.e., the stand that
supported the barrier) did not affect the ﬁelds. Muller 
5
 
Knierim
 
and Kubie (1987) suggested that the object needed to
cause changes to the animal’s movement patterns in or-
der to disrupt the spatial representation. In contrast,
the ﬁnding of misplace cells by O’Keefe and Nadel
(1978) and the goal platform results of Fyhn et al.
(2002) suggest that smaller objects can indeed alter
hippocampal ﬁring. What factors determine whether
an object will cause the local remapping phenomena
described here and cause place ﬁelds to attach to the
object? A number of clues come from other studies.
Moita et al. (2003) showed that auditory conditioned
stimuli can drive place cells in a restricted location
when the animal is trained in a fear-conditioning task;
before training, the auditory stimuli did not drive the
cells. Fyhn et al. (2002) showed that place cells were
more active at goal platforms only if the platform was in
an unexpected location; moving the platform repeat-
edly from trial to trial, such that the animal presumably
came to expect the goal instability, did not cause the
place ﬁelds to ﬁre more strongly at the platform. It is
possible that high-order cognitive factors determine
whether nonspatial stimuli are incorporated into the
hippocampal representation of an environment. These
factors may include expectancy (is an expected object
missing or displaced or is an unexpected object pres-
ent? [O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978]), behavioral contin-
gency (does this object or sound predict a behaviorally
relevant outcome? [Markus et al., 1995; Wood et al.,
1999; Moita et al., 2003]), or attention (do I need to
be paying attention to spatial cues or objects in the en-
vironment? [Kentros et al., 2004]). Perhaps a large bar-
rier automatically captures an animal’s attention in the
task used by Rivard et al. (2004); even though the bar-
rier is not explicitly related to reward contingencies, its
presence requires the animal to alter its trajectories as
it forages for the food scattered on the ﬂoor. Under-
standing the factors that control whether hippocampal
cells explicitly represent an object or fail to incorporate
it into its spatial representation is a critical question to-
ward understanding hippocampal function.
A number of recent studies from rodents, primates,
and humans have been converging on the notion that
the hippocampus and related areas may be critically in-
volved in creating object/item 
 
 
 
 place associations
(Suzuki et al., 1997; Gaffan, 1998; Davachi et al., 2003;
Ekstrom et al., 2003; Moita et al., 2003). In accordance
with the cognitive map theory, these associations may
provide the brain with an objective framework to orga-
nize and interrelate the items and events of the ani-
mal’s experience. Such a framework might be crucial
for supporting such phenomena as context-dependent
learning, and may also provide a substrate for human
episodic memory (i.e., conscious recollection of spe-
ciﬁc events in one’s past, including their spatial and
temporal context). The robust results of Rivard and
colleagues hold promise for deciphering how the hip-
pocampus, together with its input and output struc-
tures, creates spatial representations of environments
and incorporates the important objects and other dis-
crete items or events that occur in that space to guide
adaptive behavior in different contexts.
 
Olaf S. Andersen served as editor.
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